The Atlantic Alliance after Afghanistan

Transatlantic relations rebounded buoyantly after US President Joe Biden arrived in the Oval Office. But the Taliban’s rapid takeover in Afghanistan and the chaotic evacuation of foreign nationals and at-risk Afghans has soured the mood. European disquiet over Biden’s handling of the Afghan withdrawal, alongside Germany’s forthcoming federal election on September 26, makes this an opportune moment to take stock of the Atlantic alliance.

Four fundamental geopolitical changes are reshaping transatlantic relations. First, although the transatlantic link survived Donald Trump, his presidency (and near re-election), coupled with the illiberal populism that also infects Europe, has exposed the fragility of liberal democracy in its historical bastions. This internal menace, rather than China, Russia, or violent extremism, may pose the greatest threat to the transatlantic community today. Second, even though Biden’s election has reinvigorated Atlanticism, the domestic foundations of US internationalism have weakened considerably. NATO allies perceive the United States’ too-hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan as a worrying sign that Biden’s “foreign policy for the middle class” means a focus on the home front and a continuing US retrenchment in the broader Middle East. Moreover, America’s strategic preoccupation with China could mean less US attention and resources for Europe, and imply an expectation that Europeans will do more to provide for their own security. Third, the European Union has itself undergone major changes in recent years. Its internal cohesion has weakened in the face of the migration crisis, Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the stubborn hold of illiberal governments in Central Europe. The new strains on EU solidarity reinforce the need for German leadership, but also increase others’ wariness of Germany’s outsize influence. The fourth change is China’s strategic ambition and, thanks to its transnational Belt and Road Initiative, its growing global reach. The Atlantic alliance does not enjoy the material and ideological dominance it once had, and must adapt its strategic priorities accordingly. To preserve its centrality and cohesion amid this changing global landscape, the Atlantic community should pursue several objectives. As a top priority, it needs to defeat the enemy within by addressing the underlying sources of illiberal populism. Conditions are not identical in the US and Europe, but a transatlantic conversation about reducing economic insecurity, mapping out the future of work in the digital era, and recovering from COVID-19 is essential. Another high priority is developing immigration policies that meet the US and Europe’s moral obligations and economic needs but also secure their borders. Otherwise, nativist appeals will continue to gain traction.

As for NATO and the security link between North America and Europe, talk of a transatlantic rebalancing finally needs to become reality. NATO’s European members, and Germany in particular, must shoulder a significantly larger share of the defense burden and upgrade their military capability and readiness. In effect, Germany needs to become the strongest conventional military power in NATO’s European pillar. The US would remain the alliance’s existential military backbone, but it would no longer run the show. At the same time, the political importance of the US troop presence in Europe would grow, reassuring European allies that more German power means more security.

A more active European security role goes hand in hand with greater capability. As the US continues to pull back from the broader Middle East, Europeans – whether through the EU or NATO – have to pick up some of the slack to help promote stability in trouble spots such as Libya, Syria, Afghanistan, and Nagorno-Karabakh.