A new logic of cooperation for Japan–South Korea relations

The Japan–South Korea relationship has been in crisis for the past two years. 2019 was widely cited as the lowest ebb in bilateral relations since the countries established and normalised diplomatic ties in 1965.

The logical underpinnings of the 1965 normalisation process — anti-communist sentiment, US Cold War strategic objectives, South Korean authoritarianism and Japanese economic interests — were institutionalised in the form of a treaty and evolved as guiding principles for bilateral cooperation. Over time this logic for cooperation has eroded, and the bilateral relationship has deteriorated accordingly.

Nevertheless, in Tokyo, the 1965 treaty remains at the forefront of foreign policy towards Seoul and is the primary institutional framework for dealing with mutual ‘history problems’. In Seoul the treaty has been delegitimised over recent decades, particularly within progressive circles and increasingly conservative ones too.

This process of delegitimisation has been driven by the rise of victim redress movements and the domestic lawsuits that are integral to their strategy. These lawsuits have challenged the legal foundations of the 1965 treaty, specifically its clause pertaining to compensation for colonial victims. The judicial efforts of Korean wartime labourers came to a head in 2019 when a South Korean court ruling on compensation essentially drove a dagger through the 1965 agreement.

The delegitimisation of the treaty in South Korea explains, in part, why the United States — the driving force behind the normalisation process and the architect of the logic undergirding it — has lost significant leverage over the Seoul–Tokyo relationship.

The structural context of the diplomatic crisis that Japan and South Korea face today can therefore be characterised as the crumbling of the 1965 normalisation regime. How can this dilemma be navigated by the two countries’ leaders?

Groupthink on Japan–South Korea relations remains trapped in the 1965 logic that the two countries, both allies of the United States, should get along for security reasons. This view has worn thin in Tokyo and Seoul. While it makes sense in theory, it discounts the reality that both governments weigh their respective positions on history problems above the potential benefits of enhancing trilateral security cooperation. Tokyo even prioritises the abduction issue over the matter of denuclearisation in its foreign policy towards North Korea.

Japanese officials will never entertain the idea of amending the 1965 treaty to reflect the changed political realities of the bilateral relationship. This was an approach they took vis-a-vis the United States in 1960, when they amended their security treaty to rectify significant points of contention. Tokyo has instead pinned the blame for the deterioration of the relationship with South Korea on President Moon Jae-in’s government and is hedging its bets for an improved bilateral relationship with Moon’s successor.