Sudan’s states of exception

On October 25, the Sudanese military carried out a coup, announcing the dissolution of the power-sharing Sovereignty Council and the transitional government. It arrested Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and declared a state of emergency. In a statement, Sudan’s top general Abdel Fattah al-Burhan said the army had to step in because political rivalries “stirred up strife” and could lead to civil war. Al-Burhan’s move has earned near-unanimous international condemnation and stiff opposition at home, as huge protests continue to be organised.

Sudan’s escalating political crisis following the coup, now a threat to the very survival of the state, has its roots in the anomalous institutional architecture of the current political transition and the complicated relationship between its major protagonists.

The transition, which started after longtime President Omar al-Bashir was forced to step down by a popular uprising in 2019, is among the most prolonged and complicated among Sudan’s numerous past experiences and unique in the mutual hostility of its main partners.

The first (often neglected) transition the country went through was the 1953-55 self-government period, which started with an election while Sudan was still under British colonial rule. The constitution, the Self-Government Statute of 1953, was agreed in advance under colonial supervision.

It provided for an elected parliament, a cabinet, with the governor general as head of state. A referendum would decide on the deeply divisive issue of unity with Egypt versus full independence. That transition went smoothly, as parliament passed a unanimous resolution on independence without a referendum.

The Self-Government Statute was hurriedly modified to become the constitution of independent Sudan, with a five-man Sovereignty Council to replace the outgoing British governor general as ceremonial head of state. The Sovereignty Council formula was also adopted in the transitions following the October 1964 revolution, which brought down the government of Major-General Ibrahim Abboud, and the 1985 military coup against President Gaafar Nimeiry.

The transition to civilian rule in all these historical episodes happened rather fast. By contrast, in the present Sudanese transition it took almost nine months for a semblance of the civilian government to be established.

The events of the past two years rather echo a transition that is rarely included as such in Sudanese narratives: the period that followed the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between al-Bashir’s government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM). This accord ended the war in the south and set a timetable for a referendum on South Sudan’s independence.

In both cases, a constitution was put forward which was a pact between two parties, granting them exclusive powers. In the first case, we had a “transition to nowhere”, with disastrous consequences for all. The other seems to be heading the same way.

The CPA, which was supposed to put Sudan on a transition towards democratic governance, was a regionally managed affair, with significant international input. The agreement that became the backbone of the 2005 constitution, was generous on decentralisation and civil, human, and group rights. The six-year transitional period was overall very lively, if not always harmonious, with peace returning, freedoms of expression and political organisation largely respected.