Indo-Pacific vision that promises peace, prosperity

Japan’s vision for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) is nearing an inflection point. The government is faced with a choice on whether to shift its traditional strategic posture to take a firmer stance against China. Japan must decide how far it will go to defend the existing international order that the United States and its partners have largely constructed and which has diplomatically, economically and militarily benefited Japan.

Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, US President Joe Biden and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi attend QUAD leaders meeting at the prime minister’s office in Tokyo, Japan, 24 May 2022 (Photo: Reuters/The Yomiuri Shimbun).

Japan is pursuing a two-pronged strategy. On one hand, it has pushed back against China’s threats to territorial sovereignty. On the other hand, Japan has continuously engaged with China diplomatically and economically to shape its behaviour by using international rules and norms. The FOIP is the core of this diplomatic strategy. Its fundamental objective is to defend and enhance the existing rules-based international order. To date, Japan’s FOIP vision has been remarkably successful. Japan conducted ‘tactical hedging’, using ambiguous diplomacy to incorporate reactions from regional states and shape the FOIP concept over time. As current international legitimacy rests on multilateralism, this diplomatic strategy has enabled Japan to nurture international coalitions that can push back against rising challengers, particularly China.

Introduced in 2016 by Japan, the FOIP concept drew the attention of the United States and contributed to the evolution of the US Indo-Pacific strategy. Simultaneously, Japan enhanced strategic ties with the United States, Australia and India, forging the institutionalisation of the Quad. Emphasising the importance of ASEAN unity and centrality, Japan attempted to alleviate ASEAN’s concerns over its potential diplomatic marginalisation by major regional powers.

Japan has also engaged and helped to shape China’s behaviour. One of the core components of Japan’s FOIP is to promote quality infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific. It originates from Japan’s 2015 Partnership for Quality Infrastructure and emphasises openness, transparency, economic efficiency and debt sustainability. Despite initial reluctance, China accepted these principles by agreeing to the G20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment established at the 2019 Osaka summit. Cooperation with China also benefited from bilateral summits in 2018 and 2019.

This positive strategic trend has been disrupted since 2020. The COVID-19 pandemic imposed a diplomatic hiatus that indefinitely postponed the Japan–China summit scheduled for April 2020. Meanwhile, China’s assertiveness in the East and South China Seas continued to worry Japan, and its political and social suppression — including human rights violations in Xinjiang, restrictions on political freedom in Hong Kong and diplomatic and military coercion towards Taiwan — drew international attention. China’s less than critical diplomatic stance towards Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has shown Japan that China’s perspective on international rules and norms is incompatible with its FOIP principles.

Japan increasingly sees China as the most serious challenge to the existing international order. But tactical hedging is struggling to shape China’s behaviour in a sufficiently agile manner. Japan’s perception of China is also being influenced by the shifting strategic posture of like-minded states. The United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and other EU member states have raised serious concerns about China and are seeking security and economic cooperation with regional states to push back against China’s assertiveness.

This trend points towards a closer alignment of Japan with the United States and its partners, such as Australia and India, to further strengthen diplomatic pressure and military deterrence against China. These relationships risk the formation of divisions throughout the Indo-Pacific region. Yet, if Japan is not proactive, the existing international order will be eroded, as will the ability to realise Japan’s FOIP vision.

Striking a policy balance is a significant challenge, but with limited strategic options, Japan needs to make a choice soon. Japan must understand the degree of strategic commitment that like-minded states have towards the Indo-Pacific region.

East Asia Forum