Washington cannot force Japan and South Korea together

Seoul–Tokyo relations under Japan’s new Prime Minister Fumio Kishida are off to a less-than-promising start. This is no doubt frustrating for the United States, eager to foster reconciliation between two major Indo-Pacific partners.

Yet given the discord extends into factors beyond Washington’s control, it is possible that US efforts to induce reconciliation may end up backfiring.

It is not that US attempts at bridging the rift between Japan and South Korea are bad in and of themselves. There are a variety of factors that, given the way Washington views its alliances with the two in a broader strategic context, may necessitate the United States taking a more hands-off approach to the Japan–South Korea diplomatic row.

South Korean President Moon Jae-in was among the last of the United States’ major Indo-Pacific allies that Kishida spoke to after taking office. The lapse of time between Kishida’s calls with the leaders of the United States, Australia and India and South Korea is telling. That it took Kishida several days longer to reach his counterpart in Seoul than it took Kishida’s predecessor Yoshihide Suga also did not go unnoticed.

To make matters worse, immediately following Kishida’s belated call with Moon, Kishida sent an offering to Yasukuni Shrine, an act which drew lament from South Korea’s foreign ministry. Although his was not an in-person visit, the message is unmistakably clear — repairing ties with Seoul is not among Tokyo’s major priorities.

A consistent theme in the US approach to the Japan–South Korea row is to conduct diplomacy with Seoul and Tokyo behind closed doors so as not to appear as favouring one over the other. Joe Biden’s nominee for ambassador to Japan, Rahm Emmanuel, favours maintaining quiet efforts aimed at repairing Japan–South Korea ties. Emmanuel has attempted to strike a note of understanding on the extent that historic issues factor into Seoul–Tokyo relations, while remaining firm on Washington’s expressed interest in discouraging the past negatively affecting cooperation today.

But no amount of quiet diplomacy can change the fact that, while not inflexible, Japan and South Korea are unafraid to assert their interests. Kishida’s approach to Seoul demonstrates that Tokyo doesn’t share Washington’s need to rush into an improved relationship with South Korea. South Korea has also shown its willingness to place narrow interests above wider strategic goals, as demonstrated two years ago by Seoul’s near withdrawal from the Japan–South Korea General Security of Military Information Agreement.

Yet South Korean policymakers from Moon Jae-in’s Democratic Party have called for Seoul to take a constructive approach to ties with Japan and demonstrate Seoul’s goodwill in wishing to improve relations.

In light of the US need to balance between alliance politics and respect for state sovereignty, there are risks inherent in an overly active approach to improving Japan–South Korea ties. There is little denying that the main US interest in seeking the improvement of Japan–South Korea relations is that it will allow Washington to better fulfill its Indo-Pacific strategy. But by actively inducing Japan and South Korea into a friendlier relationship, the United States runs the risk of doing so on a timeline that doesn’t allow for a deep-rooted and genuine improvement.

South Korean Ambassador to the United States Lee Soo-hyuck has warned that Japan has grown frustrated by what it perceives as excessive interference from Washington in an attempt to push Japan and South Korea into closer embrace.

The United States already faces a delicate effort in demonstrating to South Korea that it does not favour Tokyo over Seoul. US policymakers, with the rocky period of 2002–2004 not too distant in the past, are no doubt sceptical of the extent to which they can trust a left-of-center South Korean government. This contrasts sharply with Japan, where the avowedly pro-American Liberal Democratic Party has consistently maintained power. In 2018, the Supreme Court here ruled that Japanese firms involved in wartime forced labor should pay compensation to the plaintiffs. About 780,000 Koreans were conscripted into forced labor by Japan during its colonization of the peninsula, according to data from Seoul.

Separately, tens of thousands of Korean women were forced into wartime sexual slavery for imperial Japanese troops. In 2015, Seoul and Tokyo reached an agreement on the resolution of the sexual slavery issue through the creation of a Japanese government-funded foundation for the purpose of compensating to the victims, euphemistically called comfort women.

Shortly after President Moon Jae-in took office in 2017, however, Seoul decided to dissolve the foundation, virtually scrapping the agreement negotiated by the administration of Moon’s predecessor Park Geun-hye with Japan. At the time, the Moon government said the accord failed to properly reflect the victims’ will.

Tokyo has argued all reparation issues stemming from its colonial rule of the peninsula were settled under a 1965 treaty that normalized South Korea-Japan relations. It has insisted legal and administrative steps taken by South Korea with regard to the issues violate international law.

Kishida has adhered to this position. He particularly felt uneasy at Seoul’s measure to cripple the 2015 accord, which was worked out when he served as foreign minister in the Abe Cabinet.

The Moon administration has recently suggested it would be more flexible in dealing with thorny issues with Japan, stressing the need to hold bilateral consultations at an early date.