Clinging to the ‘master narrative’

The forced ouster from power is hurting Imran Khan hard. His failure to stay in the good books of the military establishment has forced him to return to the people with slogans heavy on religion and anti-Americanism. The way Imran Khan has built a narrative around an American conspiracy against his government demonstrates a measure of self-conceit, but also shrewdness. He has also taken populist politics to a new level: estranged from ground realities or the art of possibilities.

Despite a categorical refutation of his conspiracy claim by the Inter-Services Public Relations, Imran Khan will continue to harp on the same theme as he has little else to offer to the people. The narrative has an attraction for his support base, which is comparatively young, comprises a large section of the urban salaried class and the Pakistani diaspora in the West. All of these groups have a lot of appetite to swallow such narratives because of their orientation to the Pakistani state. Populist politics thrives on simplistic slogans and populist leaders know that they first have to transform people into a herd and then shepherd them.

The power structure in Pakistan revolves around certain narratives which help the power elite differentiate and identify like-minded people and offer them a membership to their respective clubs. Imran Khan is playing around with a master narrative nurtured by the power elite, but he has taken it to a level where the power elite fear they may be losing control of it. Interestingly, the middle class has shaped the master narrative with the support of the bureaucracy and security institutions, who share a similar political vision. Dr Mohammad Waseem, in his book Political Conflict in Pakistan, explains that the master narrative in Pakistan is ultimately the middle-class narrative — based on Islamic ideology, all-Pakistanism, perceived Indian belligerency and a world seen from the Islamic perspective.

Imran Khan’s entire political vision revolves around this political vision (even his popular initiatives revolved around the Islamisation of institutions), which is, in turn, based on the middle class’s ideological binary: religion versus the other. According to this worldview, if any ruler makes headway in the direction of Islamisation, the ‘other’ will ultimately intervene. In this context, Imran Khan’s rhetoric will hurt the power elite the most. They have been forced to turn away from him and look to the traditional political class, which can help them resolve immediate economic and diplomatic challenges, as well as address issues related to insurgency in Balochistan and political resentment in the tribal districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This places the power elite in the ‘other’ camp in Imran Khan’s narrative.

“The political class is less ideological in the context of Islamisation of politics and more responsive to demands based on identity, culture, language, and economic equality,” according to Dr Waseem. The political class hails mainly from the smaller provinces, but a political class has recently emerged in Punjab as well, which talks about the public interest and has a large constituency. The biggest weakness of the Punjabi political class is that it cannot confront the master narrative, but would rather develop compatibility within the ideological realm and public interest.

The middle class and political class have nurtured two power centres in Pakistan. As Dr Waseem observed, these power centres define the conflict between the civil and military organs of the state. Imran Khan’s populist agenda will undermine the establishment’s interests in power as it will increase the bargaining powers of the political class in the power distribution. On the other hand, Mr Khan also has appeal among the apolitical segments of the power elite, which continues to be of concern to the establishment.

If the establishment is not ready to reconcile with Khan, it will have to throw him out from the realm of the master narrative itself. The political class can only go to an extent to counter Mr Khan’s narrative, especially when he blends his slogans with Islamisation: the reason being that the former’s support base also has a higher degree of religiosity.

Interestingly, the support base of the Pakistani political class is mainly associated with the agricultural and industrial production sectors, as well as trade. These are also areas of influence of sectarian outfits, like the Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), which promote a brand of rigid religiosity. However, these outfits are not custodians of the master narrative anymore because overplay by banned radical groups in the past had created a huge security challenge for the state. Though religiosity affects the support base of the political class, it is not at a level where they will become completely irrelevant. The political class is relevant because of its vision of public interest, which covers their economic interest as well.

The support base of the political class has somehow created a binary between its religious and political views. Mr Khan’s populist agenda can try to weaken this, and such an attempt will bring him closer ideologically to the TLP.

Dawn