The Russia and Ukraine face-off

Once again, the world is discussing the possibility of Russia waging war against Ukraine. This time, however, the circumstances are extraordinary.

Back in the spring, the buildup of Russian troops for military drills close to Ukraine’s borders ended in a series of communications between the US president and the leaders of Russia and Ukraine, followed by the summit this summer between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Joe Biden. At the time, that flare-up in tensions was explained as being down to the desire to put the Donbass conflict firmly on the agenda of the new US president and to force new talks on the issue.

Although the current escalation appears similar to that of the spring, a whole host of new circumstances has been thrown into the mix.

The Russian Foreign Ministry has broken a diplomatic taboo by publishing confidential correspondence with Germany and France over Ukraine: something that would have needed to be approved at the very top.

Speaking at the Foreign Ministry soon after this, Putin called for “serious, long-term guarantees that ensure Russia’s security in this area [its Western borders], because Russia cannot constantly be thinking about what could happen there tomorrow.”

It’s not clear what form such guarantees would take, but it’s likely that ahead of another possible summit between Putin and Biden, Moscow would like to receive assurances similar to those made to Beijing: not to enter into an open conflict with China, and not to try to change the Chinese political system. Instead of such assurances, however, Russia has seen Western military vessels close to Russia’s borders, and a resolution introduced to the US Congress that would automatically declare Putin’s rule illegitimate beyond the next elections in 2024.

It seems that Russia does not have the same sway as China to obtain the promises that one superpower has given another. As a recent superpower, Russia considers this particularly unpleasant, and the simmering conflict in eastern Ukraine could be used to give it more clout.

The West finds itself, therefore, facing the uncomfortable dilemma of whether to boost Russia’s status, thereby rewarding the dangerous exploitation of a simmering conflict, or to refuse to give Moscow the promises it desires, thus conserving the conflict in its heated state.

Russia’s action of releasing the diplomatic correspondence and Putin’s call for guarantees can be interpreted in two ways. Either Moscow has information that Kiev is seriously considering a military solution to the problem of the Donbass separatists, or Russia itself is preparing for a military operation in eastern Ukraine, and these overwrought statements are an attempt to absolve itself of responsibility for its future actions: alas, Moscow had warned of the coming storm, and called for action, but to no avail. 

The problem is that if implemented, the first scenario of Ukraine taking back Donbass by force would instantly turn into the second: of Russia invading Ukraine. Western journalists and politicians would not have enough time to decide who started it, nor indeed the motivation, since Ukraine would be acting on territory internationally recognized as its own, unlike Russia, which would inevitably be designated the aggressor.

Even if Russia were only responding to action taken by Ukraine, it would still be seen as invading: something the West has warned against. Determining how proportionate a response was to the use of force would be a long and difficult process.

In Kiev, the tone of Moscow’s statements is seen as a sign that Russia itself is preparing to strike first, and is simply trying to push responsibility for resumed hostilities elsewhere. Russia vividly recalls Georgia’s attempt to regain control over South Ossetia in 2008, which was thwarted by Russia’s intervention.

Despite the fact that Georgia’s proactive role in the events of the six-day war is now much clearer (thanks to Wikileaks and the Tagliavini report), that war is still broadly cited as an example of Russian aggression and occupation, since it unfolded on territory internationally accepted as part of Georgia, albeit at the location of a frozen conflict. Georgia’s then president Mikheil Saakashvili’s attack on South Ossetia is still considered to have been prompted by a deliberate provocation by separatists and Moscow.

In a situation in which the two sides suspect each other of harboring the worst intentions, and with every hour counting at the start of military action, the South Ossetia scenario could unfold of its own accord. A confrontation on the Donbass demarcation line that goes beyond the regular clashes could prompt a response like that over Ossetia: why wait for the worst to happen?